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THE BALANCE SHEET FOR CO-ORDINATION:
ASSETS

T

By

WM. HEDGES ROBINSON, JR.

HE future of the American Bar Association and thus of

any national bar organization lies with the Boston Convention of 1936; for this convention has before it as its
major business the acceptance or rejection of the plan for a
more representative national association. From this meeting
will come either a national bar association so organized that
it can be representative, responsible and aggressive, or a social
group more vitally concerned with conviviality and individual progress than with the welfare of the entire bar. The
question to be presented at Boston is, therefore, more than an
approval or rejection of a new constitution; it is the approval
or rejection of a new plan of life.
The proposed plan is the major asset in the present balance sheet for co-ordination. It is born of a series of plans
which began with the twentieth century. In its broad phase
it represents the new lawyer jealous of his ethics, proud of his
profession, keenly aware of his obligation to the public and
the courts and conscious of the fact that he is a part of the
judicial branch of government. Whatever flaws the proposed reorganization may have, those flaws are largely ones
which are inherent in our profession and our present attitude
toward our work, toward each other, toward the courts, and
toward the public. There can be no doubt that there must be
a complete reversal of opinion by the profession and the
elimination of public antipathy. But these changes may
come if courageous and far-seeing leaders are selected under
the new government.
What then is the new government? Briefly, its underlying scheme is the centralization of control in responsible
agencies. The present governmental structure is remodeled
beyond recognition, for only a very debilitated Assembly and
a form of Executive Committee exist while the Conference of
Bar Delegates is abolished entirely.
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The administration of the association under the plan is
vested largely in a House of Delegates consisting of approximately two hundred members, composed as follows: (a)
State delegates-chosen one from each state, including the
District of Columbia, and Hawaii and one for the territorial
group of American possessions. A delegate is nominated by
a petition signed by 25 members of the American Bar Association in the state and filed with the Board of Elections not
less than 120 days before the annual meeting. Ballots are
mailed to each member of the Association within the state,
and must be returned to the board 60 days before the annual
meeting. The terms of the state delegates is for three years.
(b) State Bar Association delegates-each recognized state
or territorial bar association is entitled to one delegate, and in
addition may have one delegate for every thousand lawyers
in the state in excess of 2,000, according to the last federal
census; provided, however, no state bar association is entitled
to more than four delegates. The term of these delegates is
for two years. (c) Local Bar Association delegates-any
local association which has at least 800 members, 25 per cent
of whom are members of the American Bar Association, is
entitled to one delegate, but the additional state bar association delegates are reduced by the number of local bar association delegates within the state. That is, if the local bar associations have two delegates, then the state association cannot
have more than two. Their term is two years. (d) Assembly delegates-five delegates chosen annually by the assembly.
(e) Affiliated organization delegates-each affiliated organization having 25 per cent of its members belonging to the
association is entitled to one delegate. (f) Officials delegates
-The President of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the Chairman of the National
Conference of Bar Examiners, the Chairman of the National
Conference of Judicial Councils, the President of the Association of American Law Schools, the Attorney General and
Solicitor General of the United States, the President of the
National Association )f Attorneys General, the Chairman of
each Section of the Association, and the Board of Governors
are all delegates.
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In a general way the membership from the
groups will be:
State Delegates.------------State Bar Association ------------------------------------Local Bar Association
------------------Assembly Association
---------------------Affiliated Organizations -----------------------------------Officials Delegates
-----------------------Total

-----------------------------

various
51
82
11
5
5
36
190

The powers of the House of Delegates are as follows:
(1) To control and administer the association, (2) to submit certain defined questions to the members for a referendum, (3) to elect by a majority vote the officers of the association, (4) to supervise the employees of the association,
(5) to establish, discontinue or abolish sections, (6) to approve or disapprove section by-laws, (7) to receive reports of
sections and committees, (8) to concur in constitutional
amendments by two-thirds vote, (9) to appropriate money
and budget funds, (10) to authorize participation of association in litigation, and (11) to reject or approve resolutions offered by the assembly. Meetings of the house may be
called at any time by the Board of Governors or upon written
request of the majority of its members. Fifty members make
a quorum.
Thus it will be seen the house is largely a legislative unit,
determining policies and procedure. It has all of the powers
of the present convention assembly, and in addition it is more
fairly representative in character. A much more exact expression of opinion should come from this body than from present irresponsible, unrepresentative assembly.
There are several points pertaining to the assembly that
need clarifying in the present draft. One is the provision
relating to the reduction of state bar association delegates
whenever local bar association delegates are selected. Every
recognized state association shall have one delegate, regardless
of the number of local bar association delegates there may be.
Suppose, however, that more than three local associations can
qualify for delegates, then is each qualified local bar association
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entitled to a delegate regardless of the fact that there may be
more than three such associations? If the state is allowed
only three local bar associations, some association will be
unrepresented. No method of selection of the three delegates
is made for a situation of this kind. Section six of article
five should be clarified on this point, even though there is no
present indication that this question can rise for a number of
years.
Very frequently state bar associations in non-integrated
or non-federated states are not representative in any degree of
the lawyers within the state. Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania and Texas have state bar associations
whose membership is less than 35 per cent of the lawyers in
the state. On the other hand, local associations in Denver,
New Haven, Baltimore, Boston and New York City have
nearly as many, if not more, members than the state association. To permit the state bar association a representation
and to deny it in some cases to the local association does cause
a certain lack of representation. In addition, in some states,
such as Louisiana, two state bar associations exist. For the
House of Delegates to select one or the other as the qualified
association is a delicate task whose commission is apt to breed
politics and engender unpleasantness. There is no doubt,
however, that the proposed constitution should do much to
increase state bar association membership and by that means
may overcome obstacles and make the qualified associations
more representative.
The executive branch of the proposed governmental
structure is the Board of Governors. In composition and in
its powers it is very similar to the present Executive Committee. The president, the chairman of the House of Delegates,
the last retiring president, the .secretary, the treasurer, the
editor-in-chief, and one member from each federal circuit to
be selected from the house compose its membership. It has
power (1) to administer the affairs of the association when
the house is not in session, (2) to make the publication useful
and of practical assistance to the members, (3) to present the
duties of the assistant secretaries and the executive secretary,
(4) to recommend the establishment or abolition of the sec-
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tions, (5) to arrange the program for the annual meeting,
(6) to appropriate money, and (7) to authorize intervention
of the association in litigation or controversy.
The assembly under the new plan is practically without
power. Consisting of all members of the association in good
standing present at the convention, it will become chiefly a
sounding board for the president's speech and for the reports
of the committees. Its only powers are to elect five members
to the House of Delegates, to refer questions to the entire
membership for a referendum vote, and to amend the constitution by a two-thirds vote provided 200 members are present. It does not have the power to select the officers of the
association.
Officers of the Board of Governors and chairman of the
house are nominated by the state delegates to the house, meeting at least 70 days prior to the annual convention, and the
house elects all officers. However, if a majority of the state
bar associations in any federal circuit so signify their desire,
the board member from that district may be elected by a
direct mail vote. In addition, if any 200 members of the
association, of which not more than 100 are in one state, shall
desire to nominate any person to any office in the association
they may file a nomination petition with the Board of Elections.
The sections and committees exist virtually the same as
at the present and will meet during the convention period as
before. Because of the limited functions of the assembly,
membership and interest should be increased in the section
meetings.
Of course, certain powers remain with the membership
as a whole. Chiefly these are to vote on referred questions, to
select delegates to the house, to attend the assembly, and upon
certain conditions to nominate the officers of the association.
The final bit of reorganization centers around the Journal. Instead of being composed of a self-perpetuating board
as before, it, too, will assume a more representative character.
The Board of Editors will consist of eight members, the president, the chairman of the house, five members selected for a
term of five years by the Board of Governors, and an editorin-chief selected by the other members of the board. This
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body will govern the Journal, subject to the approval of the
Board of Governors.
This, in brief, is the new plan of government. It takes
cognizance of the fact that an attempted government of the
affairs of the association by 27,000 members results in the
control of the association by the few. It attempts to substitute direct and quasi-proportional representation for the
present convention assembly. This is a firm, sensible plan,
and if officers who may be selected under it are keenly aware
of their obligations, the American Bar Association may become truly what its name signifies.
The new plan is, therefore, the major asset in the balance sheet, but there is another which is almost of like importance. It is the gradual awakening of lawyers to a professional consciousness. This awakening can be seen in the
plans submitted for the reorganization of the national association. It can be seen in the general spread of both the integrated and the federalized state bar associations. It can be
seen in aggressive campaigns against unauthorized practice and
against the shyster. It can be seen in the growing desire of
bar associations to increase membership and to furnish aid to
their members. This awakening holds the promise for the
legal profession in America. There can be no doubt that the
bar has long been somnolent. It has been negligent of its
duty to the courts and to the profession. It has made no
atempt to contact the populace and to spread a better understanding of the spirit of the law. It has made little effort to
reform procedure and gear it to the needs of the day. Instead,
it has allowed a hostile public opinion to exist against the
legal profession. It has permitted our courts to bog in the
morass of legalisms and judicial laziness. It has let our courts
and our prosecuting attorneys be openly tainted with political corruption. It has suffered the enormous growth of dictatorial administrative bodies, openly hostile to the lawyer.
It has allowed practitioners and adjusters to practice law
without hindrance. Against the shyster, it has acknowledged
defeat, permitting the federal government to eject them from
the profession. Without retort it has allowed the legal profession to be vilified and the term lawyer to become synonymous with shyster. Because of these things and many more
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the bar cannot command respect of the public. Yet, if the
lawyer is to exist, he cannot see these things continue. They
must be resisted vigorously. Therefore, the arousing of the
lawyer to his responsibility by encouraging better bar organization, by spreading information about legal reform, by
insisting on a higher standard of ethics and higher planes of
legal education, by waging campaigns against unauthorized
practice, by encouraging more modern means of selecting
judges, and by making the lawyer aware that he is a part of
the judicial branch of government, must be part of a gigantic
campaign in every state. It must be a national, militant
movement.
Some start along this direction has been made by the
American Bar Association in its co-ordination plan by securing hundreds of committee lawyers to work together on the
subjects of the national bar program and also by the dissemination of information concerning integration and federalization. As a result there has been a gradual awakening of the
profession to its responsibilities. Unfortunately, the awakening is slow. It needs forceful and understanding publicity
and well-directed activity. What publicity the national association has supplied has been largely unplanned and personal.
Publicity must come from a national headquarters conceived
with two purposes: (1) To inform the public, and (2) to
arouse the lawyer.
In that the national bar program has begun to create a
consciousness among lawyers of professionalism, it should
rank as the second asset on the balance sheet. Under the proposed government splendid opportunities exist for intelligent
publicity which will benefit every lawyer and bring the public
to a close appreciation of the problems of the legal profession. No committee can handle publicity and, fortunately,
the plan does away with such a committee. The drafters of
the plan expressly state that they believe publicity can be
better handled and directed from national headquarters. If
the officers who may be selected under the new form of government realize the value and necessity of publicity, the American Bar Association can be the largest factor for the improvement of justice and for the strengthening of the legal profession that has yet existed in this country.
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The third asset is the attempt by the association to give
more service to its members. This can be seen in the idea of
the service letter. It is noticeable in the Conference of Bar
Examiners, which will give to bar examiners character information about those seeking admission to the bar and which
attempts to improve the type of bar examinations. The idea
of service can be perceived in the section work. New publications, such as Legal Notes on Local Government, sponsored
by the Section of Municipal Law, are attempting to bring
assistance to the lawyers specializing in certain fields; while
the Section on Legal Education is constantly endeavoring to
raise legal education requirements in the states. These are
healthy signs. Possibly the day may not be so far away when
the American Bar Association will mean as much to the profession and to the public as the American Medical Association
does in its field, and when the Journal of the former will be
as essential to the lawyer as the Journal of the latter is to the
doctor.
There is a growing recognition of the necessity that a
bar association should give service. That is significant; and
the proposed plan would be that much stronger if in its preamble it would make mention of the fact that the American
Bar Association desires to be of service to its members.
So these are the assets: (1) Proposed plan of government, (2) an awakening of legal consciousness, and (3) the
beginning of the service idea. Against these assets are set the
liabilities of (1) the individualistic attitude of the lawyer,
(2) inadequate and doubtful public relation, (3) present
status of bar associations, (4) low returns for association
dues, (5) duplication among existing organizations, and (6)
the present organization of the American Bar Association.
While the assets are less numerous than liabilities, yet they
have greater potentialities. If the Boston convention ratifies
the proposed plan, then the way is open for a truly national
organization. With adequate governmental machinery and
visionary leaders the American Bar Association can gain much
in prestige and influence. Whether the balance sheet will
show a profit or loss remains with the Boston convention and
the leaders it selects.

UNLAWFUL PRACTICE OF LAW
The following is the opinion of the court in Case No.
13,583, in the matter of the complaint against certain of the
Denver clearing house banks.
The opinion is followed by a statement of the principles
and canons of ethics between the Denver Bar Association and
the trust departments of the banks.

Complainants are hereinafter referred to as the Committee, and respondents as the Banks, or as The Colorado, The
International, The Denver, The United States, and The
American, respectively. The Committee says the Banks are
practicing law and the Banks deny the charge.
Originally one Walker charged The Colorado and its
trust officers that through said officer, but as the corporation,
it drafted a will, probated it and administered trust estates
thereby created. This complaint was referred to the Committee with directions to "give the matters therein set forth
thorough and careful consideration and record fully its findings in the premises."
"Matters," said the Court, "is intended to cover the entire subject irrespective of how limited
the issues in the particular case might be."
The Colorado denied receiving compensation for drafting the questioned will, otherwise it admitted. The Committee sent questionnaires to the Banks and these were answered.
A hearing before the Committee followed at which the Banks
were represented by counsel. The matter was submitted on
printed briefs, which, on request of counsel and by our order,
later became the briefs now before us. The Committee presented its majority report and one of its members, which
might be termed a specially concurring report. We ordered
these filed and authorized the Committee to prosecute the
charges before this court in its own name with Mr. Melville
251
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as its counsel. Oral argument followed and the cause was
finally submitted.
It will be observed that we thus have before us an agreed
case in which the banks, save The Colorado, voluntarily appeared.
At the time this matter was referred to the Committee
it was contemplated that it might be necessary or advisable,
if it proceeded to final hearing before us, either to hand down
an opinion that would cover a very broad field, or adopt a
rule which would serve the same purpose. Various considerations have, however, obviated that necessity. Among these
may be noted that it is alleged herein and not denied that the
Banks have administered no estates since September 1, 1929,
without the services of an attorney outside of their organizations. It also appears, as a matter of common knowledge in
banking and legal circles, hence noticeable judicially in a proceeding such as this, that the Banks and the Denver Bar Association have entered into an amicable agreement as to the
respective fields of lawyers and trust companies. While such
an agreement is in no respect binding upon the courts, nor
conclusive as to what is or is not "practicing law," it raises
the strongest presumption that in general no present cause of
complaint against the Banks with respect to minor and collateral matters now exist. Two points, however, are presented, the adjudication of which seems indispensable to a final
disposition of this proceeding. The Committee reports, and
we think the evidence before us supports the conclusion, that
the Banks as a practice, (1) have drafted wills wherein they
were named as executors or trustees, and given legal advice to
the testators with respect thereto; (2) have drawn living
trust indentures and life insurance trust agreements in which
they were named as trustees, and given legal advice to the
executorsof such documnts; in both classes of cases without
testator or executor having independent legal advice.

DICTA

253

Before disposing of the questions thus presented we make
one brief observation on the fact and restate one admitted and
governing proposition of law.
The questioned acts of the banks have been performed
by their trust officers. These officers are regular salaried employees, integral and essential parts of the bank's organization, generally members of the bar but practically limited, by
custom or contract, to the bank's business, hence in all their
acts on behalf of the corporation as much a part of it as its
president or cashier.
Corporations cannot practice law. "Practice of the Law"
is not limited to practice before the Court. 2 R. C. L., Sec.
4, page 938. But under all attempted definitions it includes
the drafting of documents which of necessity must be presented to, and their legality passed upon by, the courts.
1. We think the drawing of wills, as a practice, is the
practice of law, and this for three reasons: First, because of
the profound legal knowledge necessary for one who makes
a practice of this work; second, because all these instruments,
before they become effective, must be filed in and administered
by a Court; and, third, because what we consider the weight
of authority so holds. People vs. People's Stockyards State
Bank, 344 Illinois 462, 176 N. E. 902; Will of Marek, 177
Wis. 194, 198, 187 N. W. 1009; People vs. People's Trust
Company, 167 N. Y. Supp. 767, 180 App. Div. 494; In re
Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac.
157.
2. In our opinion the practice of drafting living trust
indentures and life insurance trust agreements and giving
legal advice to the executors of such documents, is likewise
"the practice of law;" but for reasons hereinafter appearing
it is unnecessary to elaborate this ruling.
Since the record before us discloses no desire to mulct the
Banks in damages and discloses no wish to do more than set-
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tie the law and establish the correct practice, and finding the
Banks have in some instances technically and doubtless unintentionally overstepped the bounds here established, we adjudge them to pay the costs of this proceeding.
That the foregoing questions, and others collaterally
involved herein may be the more effectively placed before the
profession in this jurisdiction and similar controversies
avoided in the future we have this day adopted the following
rule, effective September 1, 1936:
'Practicing law,' forbidden to persons not thereto duly
licensed, is not limited to practice before the courts. Corporations shall not practice law. The practice of drafting wills,
living trust indentures and life insurance trust agreements is
the practice of law and counsel for executors and trustees
named therein may not act as counsel for their testators -or
creators."
It should be added that those portions of the foregoing
rule dealing with practices complained of in this proceeding
are covered by the agreement heretofore referred to between
the banks and the Denver Bar Association. So that the rule
fixes no limits on the activities of the banks save such as they
have already fixed by their contract. It is of course immaterial that the contract stipulates that its execution is no admission on the part of the banks that the acts from which it
therein agrees to refrain constitute the practice of law.
Mr. Justice Bouck, desiring time to examine the record
more thoroughly, is not ready to vote, and he may file a
separate opinion when he has reached a conclusion.
Mr. Chief Justice Campbell not participating.

Jesse H. Jones, Chairman of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, reports that Wyoming is the only state in the Union in which it
has been unnecessary to disburse any of the money authorized by the
RFC Act for distribution to depositors in closed banks.

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND CANONS
OF CONDUCT
Between the
DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION

and the
TRUST DEPARTMENTS OF THE DENVER CLEARING

HOUSE BANKS
WHEREAS, The Denver Bar Association and the members
of the Denver Clearing House Association (in connection
with their Trust Departments) desire to arrive at an understanding and to provide a method for the adjustment of any
differences that may arise between them; and
WHEREAS, Each of the parties hereto recognizes that
trust business is the business of administering estates and

trusts, and acting as agent in all appropriate cases and engaging in other trust activities; that it is advisable that a trust
institution should limit its functions to such services; that
attorneys-at-law constitute a professional group that performs essential functions in relation to trust business; that
attorneys-at-law recognize the advantages inherent in corporate fiduciary services and have a community of interest
with trust institutions in the common end of service to the
public; and that the maintenance of harmonious relations
between trust institutions and members of the. bar is in the
best interests of both, and of the public as well;
Now, THEREFORE, The parties hereto accept the following as proper principles and canons of conduct, and
adopt the procedure herein laid down for the adjustment of
differences between them:
(1)
It is to the best interests of the public for a prospective testator to employ his own attorney or an attorney of
his Own selection and to have full opportunity .for free consultation with the attorney who prepares his will.
The banks declare that they do not and will not draw
wills or codicils thereto.
A prospective testator may consult and discuss with a
bank any contemplated appointment of such bank in" any
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capacity under a will or a codicil, and the bank may collaborate with the attorney of the prospective testator in the preparation of any such will or codicil.
(2)
An attorney consulted or employed by a client for
the preparation of any instrument under which a bank is to
be appointed in a fiduciary capacity should suggest to the client the desirability of permitting the bank to examine the
instrument for the purpose of ascertaining if it will consent
to act thereunder; and, in all cases where the customer of a
bank desires to name said bank as executor or trustee, an
attorney should, with the consent of his client, confer with
the bank with respect to the preparation of such instrument
and such appointment.
(3)
A bank shall not refer a person to any attorney
for services in connection with the drafting of any instrument
in which the bank may be named as executor or as trustee;
but, where a person desiring to name a bank as executor or as
trustee states that he has no attorney of his own whom he
desires to act for him and requests the bank to suggest an
attorney, the bank may suggest several attorneys, among
whom shall not be included any attorney regularly employed
or retained as the bank's counsel.
(4)
A trustee should not ordinarily accept a living
trust, revocable or irrevocable, unless the instrument creating
it has been prepared or approved by an independent attorney
of the trustor's own selection.
(5)
A bank will not draw trust indentures or similar
instruments securing notes or bond issues for public distribution.
(6)
A bank shall not make appearance in any court
except by an attorney representing it, and shall not, directly
or indirectly, apply to its own use or receive the benefit of
any part of the fee allowed or paid to any attorney.
(7)
A bank shall not in its advertising or soliciting
hold itself out as prepared to give legal advice or render legal
services.
(8)
In every situation where under this instrument, or
otherwise, a customer is entitled to the independent advice or
service of any attorney, the undivided character of the alle-
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giance of such attorney to his client shall be scrupulously
maintained and respected.
(9)
It is not intended herein to define what is or is not
practicing law. As to all matters herein specified and as to
other matters which may arise it is the intent and spirit of this
instrument that every bank should endeavor to conduct its
business so that it cannot justly be said that it is practicing
law.
(10)
The term bank as used herein shall include banks,
trust companies and trust departments of other corporations;
the term attorney as used herein means attorney-at-law.
(11)
The parties hereto agree that they will in good
faith promote and recommend the observance by their constituent members of the principles and canons herein set forth.
They deem the observance thereof to be conducive to sound
and orderly banking, and to sound and orderly legal practice, and the public interest.
(12)
Recognizing that the successful application of
these principles and canons will require supervision and interpretation by a continuing body representing both groups;
that exceptional situations will arise where literal application of the principles and canons of conduct herein set forth
would be impracticable and unwise, it is further agreed that
there shall be a standing conference committee of six members
for the administration and interpretation hereof. Three members shall be appointed by the president of the Denver Bar
Association; the terms of such first appointed bar members
of the committee shall be for one, two and three years, respectively, and all subsequent appointments shall be for threeyear terms. Three members shall be appointed by the Trust
Officers Group of the Denver Clearing House Association, for
such terms as said group may from time to time determine.
The first meeting of said committee may be called by any
member thereof. The committee shall adopt its own rules
providing for calling of meetings and conduct of its business. Said committee shall hear complaints and consider
questions arising hereunder presented by members of the bar,
the banks or other interested persons, and shall take such steps
in regard thereto as may seem desirable. This instrument shall
become effective when approved by the Denver Bar Associa-
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tion and by the Trust Officers Group in the Denver Clearing
House Association.
(13)
This instrument may be revoked by either party
hereto upon sixty (60) days' notice in writing to the other.
In case of such revocation, the rights, privileges or duties of
the parties and of their constituent members shall not be
prejudiced by the execution or performance hereof, nor shall
anything herein be deemed to constitute an admission as to
what is or is not permissible under the law.
Denver, Colorado, this sixth day of January, 1936.
THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION,

By Robert E. More, President.
Attest: JAMES A. WOOD, Secretary.
THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK OF DENVER,

By H. F. Feucht, Trust Officer.
THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST COMPANY OF DENVER,

By Leroy McWhinney, Vice-President.
THE DENVER NATIONAL BANK,

By H. E. Parks, Trust Officer.
THE COLORADO NATIONAL BANK OF DENVER,

By Hugh McLean, Trust Officer.
THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK,

By A. H.. Jewel, Trust Officer.
ANNOUNCEMENT
The Committee on Unlawful Practice of the Law expects
to be very active and asks that objectionable practices from
any source, either on the part of attorneys or laymen, be reported to Jacob V. Schaetzel, chairman, or to any member.
The following were appointed as members of a subcommittee, to-wit:
MERRILL A. KNIGHT, Chairmanof the Sub-Committee.
ROYAL RUBRIGHT,

Prosecutor

STANLEIGH CRISPELLE

MILTON GARWOOD

DONALD Fox

GRANT MCGEE
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EDW. B. CASEY
The Chicago Bar Journal makes the following report on
a candidate for Chief Justice of the Municipal Court of Chicago:
EDWARD B. CASEY-Republican-6914 Sheridan Road.
Age 35. He was born in Denver, Colorado. He secured his prelegal education by attending public grammar and high schools and
Speer's Latin School at Denver and by taking one year of the pre-legal
course at Notre Dame University. He studied law at Notre Dame University Law School from which he received an LL.B. degree cum laude.
He was admitted to the Bar of Illinois in October, 1924, and practiced
law in Chicago from that date until his election as a judge of the
municipal court in April, 1931. From August, 1927, to April, 1931,
he was an assistant corporation counsel assigned to the board of local
improvements. In November, 1932, he was re-elected as a judge of
the municipal court for a term of six years. He is a member of the
Chicago Bar Association.
In his service of five years as a judge of the municipal court he has
been diligent, courteous and fair-minded. He is resolute and perseveringi
and in the opinion of the committee he possesses administrative ability.
He is qualified for the office.

Al Vogl makes the line again with the following:
In view of the attached, "Scintillating Omnilucence" and
"Bceotian Mediocrity" is a mere piker.
In attempting to describe our meaning of the term "Red" we are
reminded of the usually meaningless, but here significant, alleged scientific analysis of the Aurora Borealis. Particular attention is called to the
last sentence of the following: When the molofigiastical temperature of
the Horizon becomes such as to coloracize the impurient indentations of
the hemispheric analogy, thus affected, a rapid change takes place in the
thorambumpter of the borax kerbustus of the aquavarusale,-which can
only be seen when it is visible.

Most things can only be seen when they are visible.
Al didn't say where he found them "woids."

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-LIABILITY OF CORPORATION WHICH
MERELY CONTRACTS WITH ANOTHER CORPORATION TO HAN-

DLE ITS PRODUCTS-BukoWich, et al. vs. The Ford Motor Company, et al.-No. 13843-Decided June 29, 1936--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bouck.
Bukowich was granted an award of compensation by the Industrial Commission against the Ford Motor Company, which award was
vacated by the District Court. Bukowich was an employee of Mansfield Motors, Inc., a corporation, at Glenwood Springs. This corporation was merely a dealer in Ford automobiles and trucks. The Mansfield Motors, Inc., purchased and paid for a truck in Denver, Colorado,
and the plaintiff was injured while driving this truck from Denver to
Glenwood Springs and fell asleep at the wheel while approaching
Glenwood Springs and the truck ran off the road into the Colorado
River, whereby he suffered injuries.
1. The claimant first filed his claim solely against the Mansfield
Motors, Inc., a corporation, by whom he was employed. He plainly
regarded himself as an employee of that corporation and not of the Ford
Motor Company. The evidence clearly establishes that he was never an
employee of the Ford Motor Company but was solely an employee of
Mansfield Motors, Inc., a Ford dealer, and he had no cause of action
against the Ford Motor Company.
2. Mansfield Motors, Inc., although selling Ford products, was
in no sense a dealer exclusively in these products as this company while
selling Ford products contracted for and sold the products of various
other companies.
3. Under the evidence in this case, the Ford Motor Company was
not a corporation operating, engaging in, or conducting a business by
contracting out any part or all of the work within the meaning of Section 49 of the Industrial Act.
4. Therefore, Bukowich was not an employee of the Ford Motor
Company and the judgment below adjudging that the Ford Motor
Company was not liable for compensation was right.-Judgment
affirmed.
DISMISSAL-PRACTICE-Ex PARTE DISMISSAL-POWER OF COURT
TO SET ASIDE-Pittman, et al. vs. Marshall-No. 13948-De-

cided June 29, 1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Plaintiff below issued a summons which was duly served. The
summons was issued before a complaint was filed. Within the ten days
for filing the complaint negotiations were had toward a settlement. An
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ex parte application of defendant for dismissal for failure to file the
complaint was made and cause dismissed. Plaintiff filed a motion to
set aside the dismissal and the order of dismissal was set aside.
1. Where a cause has been dismissed ex parte on application of
the defendant for failure to file the complaint within ten days after the
issuance of the summons it was proper for the court to set aside the
dismissal and permit the plaintiff to dismiss without prejudice in order
that he might be entitled to bring another suit on the same cause of
action.-Judgmentaffirmed.
Mr. Chief Justice Campbell not participating.

DEEDS-MORTGAGES-CONSTRUCTION-ONCE
A MORTGAGE ALWAYS A MORTGAGE-AcCOUNT-Taylor, et al. vs. Briggs, et al.
-No.
13455-Decided June 29, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Hilliard.
A suit was filed June 1, 1931, by Taylor and his wife to have an
instrument, absolute in terms, under which Briggs and Land Investment
Company claim to hold, adjudged to be a mortgage, with privilege to
redeem. Continental Oil Company held an oil lease under Briggs and
Land Company, cancellation of which the Taylors prayed, but during
trial it was agreed that the lease should be recognized and follow the
title. Judgment of dismissal of the Taylor complaint was entered

below.
1. Where a mortgagor and mortgagee arrange for a friendly foreclosure of a second mortgage against the property for the benefit of the
mortgagor as well as the mortgagee any title acquired thereby by the
mortgagee will be deemed to be held for the benefit of the mortgagor
under such agreement.
2. Under such circumstances the title acquired by the mortgagee
through the foreclosure of the mortgage, while absolute on its face, is
in effect a mortgage. It became so, not because of fraud or mistake,
but because by competent evidence an equity superior to its terms was
established.
3. It is the spirit of the original transaction, not the form, that
enables the court to perceive and moves it to declare the refinements of

justice.
4. The character of the transaction is fixed at its inception and is
what the intention of the parties makes it. The form of the transaction and the circumstances attending it are the means of finding out the
intention. If it was a mortgage in the beginning it remains so, in accordance with the maxim "once a mortgage always a mortgage."
5. Where it appears that the mortgagee's claim was less than
$5,000 and in selling the oil lease on the property he was given a down
payment of $25,000 and reserved royalties in excess of $12,000 he
could not arbitrarily dispose of Taylor's recognized equity in the prop-
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erty. He was not at liberty thus to deal with his helpless debtor where
he had failed to invoke his remedy of foreclosure.
6. Under the facts in this case Briggs was only entitled to half
of the principal and interest on his debt, taxes on the property paid by
him, expense of foreclosure and other proper expenditures allowed and
should be required to account for the excess above this received from the
oil lease.-Judgment reversed.
Mr. Justice Holland dissents.

BANKS-CORPORATIONS-WHAT CONSTITUTES PRACTICE OF LAW
-BY CORPORATIONS-The People vs. The Denver Clearing House

Banks, et al.-No. 13583-Decided June 29, 1936--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Burke.
Original proceedings against certain. banks to prevent them from
practicing law.
1. Corporations cannot practice law.
2. Practice of the law is-not limited to practice before the courts.
3. Practice of the law includes the drafting of documents which
of necessity must be presented to, and their legality passed upon by, the
courts.

4. The drawing of wills is the practice of law.
5. The drafting of living trust indentures and life insurance trust
agreements, and giving legal advice to the executors of such documents,
is the practice of law.
6. The following -rule was. adopted by the-supreme court effective
September 1, 1936: "Practicing law, forbidden to persons not thereto
duly licensed, is not limited to practice before the courts. Corporations
shall not practice law. The practice of drafting wills, living trust indentures and life insurance trust agreements is the practice of law and
counsel for executors and trustees named therein may not act as counsel
for their testators or creators." '
Mr. Chief Justice Campbell not participating. Mr. Justice Bouck,
desiring time to consider the question, did not vote, but reserved the
right to file a separate opinion.

EMBEZZLEMENT SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE INSTRUCTIONS
RECORD OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS-VERBAL EVIDENCE THERE-

OF Lewis, etal. vs. The People-No. 13614-DecidedJune 29,
19 36--Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
Thomas L. Lewis, Miles G. Saunders and Ethel L. Westcott were
convicted of.embezzlement of certain monies from the Railway Savings
and Building Association, a corporation.
1. Evidence examined and held sufficient to submit to the jury the
question of -conversion of the monies of the Railway Savings and Building Association.
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2. In order to constitute the crime of embezzlement there must
not only be a conversion of the monies or personal property, but there
must be evidence of a criminal intent in making the conversion.
3. Evidence examined and held to be insufficient to prove a criminal intent in making the conversion.
4. In a criminal action of embezzlement where the defendant
believed that he had a right to a part of the money as compensation
and so converted it he would not be guilty of embezzlement, because
his action is predicated on a mistake as to his right in the thing taken
which negatives the specific intent to do what the law inhibits, namely,
the taking of the property of another with intent to convert it to his
own use.
5. An unlawful conversion alone is never conclusive as against
the defense of good faith supported by evidence of an honest claim of
right.
6. The court properly refused defendant's motion for an instructed verdict of not guilty.
7. Evidence of independent transactions in nowise connected
with the alleged act of embezzlement were erroneously admitted.
8. Evidence by an accountant, which shows on its face an incomplete investigation, was improperly admitted.
9. Where copies of the public record duly sworn to by the officer
of the corporation were admitted in evidence it was error to permit the
district attorney on cross-examination to attempt to impeach the public
record so introduced by him that the officer swearing to the report knew
nothing in regard to the matter therein set forth.
10. Oral evidence is admissible to prove what actually occurred
at a meeting of the board of directors of the corporation notwithstanding there are no written minutes of the action taken.
11.
It was error for the court to refuse to submit to the jury an
instruction to the effect that an order or resolution made or adopted by
a board of directors at a meeting of such board which has been omitted
from the minutes, if proved to have been made or adopted, it is as valid
and effective as if entered in minutes. The defendant was entitled to an
instruction that if the defendant was informed and advised by the
attorney for the Railway Savings and Building Association that such
defendant had the legal right to take and receive commissions on the
sales of stock made in the office of the association, and overriding commissions on stock sold by sub-agents, and that such defendant in good
faith believed and relied upon such advice so received the money charged
in the information to have been embezzled, relying upon such information and advice of such attorney, then and in that event a verdict of not
guilty should be returned as to said defendant.--Judgment reversed.
Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Holland
concur. Mr. Chief Justice Campbell, Mr. Justice Burke and Mr. Justice Butler dissent.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY FOR ACCUMULATION OF ICE
ON SIDEWALK CAUSING INJURY-City of Alamosa vs. Johnson

13749-Decided June 29, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice
-No.
Butler.
In a personal injury action, Julia E. Johnson recovered judgment
against the City of Alamosa. The city seeks a reversal of the judgment. She fell on rough ice permitted to remain on the sidewalk at
the end of a bridge where she was required to step down some eight
inches off the bridge walk and broke her right leg.
1. The fact that there is ice on a sidewalk, due to natural rather
than artificial cause, and that it is slippery, unless there is a bunch or
projection or a pile of it that makes the walk uneven and likely to
cause stumbling, does not ordinarily indicate such negligence on the
part of a municipality as to make it liable.
2. A municipality is required to exercise ordinary care to keep
its sidewalks in a reasonable safe condition for travel.
3.
What is ordinary care in a given case must be determined by
the locality, climate, weather conditions, and other circumstances.
4. Under the circumstances of this case it was a jury question
whether the city's conceded failure to take any steps to obviate or lessen
the danger was or was not the exercise of ordinary care.
5.
Lack of funds with which to repair is no defense.
6. Refusal of the court to give requested instruction is proper.
-Judgment affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-ISSUES
TO BE DETERMINED BY COMMISSION-EFFECT OF FORMER

OPINION-Black Diamond Fuel Company, et at. vs. Frank, et al.
-No.
13910-Decided June 29, 1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Holland.
Frank filed a claim with the Industrial Commission for compen7
sation. The claim was rejected because no notice of claim was filed
within six months. This was affirmed by the district court and upon
review the supreme court reversed it and remanded the case solely an
the issue of how much compensation should be awarded. Thereupon
further hearing was had and dispute arose as to what the issues were.
The claimant rested solely on the amount of compensation on the
theory that the question in statutes of limitations had been decided in
the former proceedings in error.
1. Where the commission did not take the opportunity to fully
hear in the term of the issues this court should not have precluded the
parties from following the issues first presented to a conclusion, nor
should the commission have done so.
2. It should have been determined first whether the injury occurred in the course of employment; whether it was compensable;
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whether the medical treatment received by claimant could properly be
held the payment within the statute precluding the running of the
statute of limitations on the question of notice.
3. Our former decision in Frank vs. Industrial Commission is
overruled and the judgment in the present case is reversed and the cause
remanded and to be transmitted to the commission to hear and determine all three questions.--Judgment reuersed.
Mr. Justice Young concurs in part and dissents in part. Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bouck dissent.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PERMANENT
INJURY FROM Two
DIFFERENT ACCIDENTS-APPORTIONING
AWARD BETWEEN

Two DIFFERENT INSURANCE CARRIERS-The Century Indemnity Company vs. Klipfel, et al.-No. 13904-Decided June 29,
1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
Klipfel was injured in the course of his employment and compen-,
sation was carried by The Century Indemnity Company. The insurance carrier paid temporary disability. The claimant returned to work
and. was thereafter injured in a second accident at which time the
Travelers Insurance Company was carrying the compensation. At a
hearing it was determined, based upon- medical. testimony, that the
claimant suffered permanent injury which was a result of both accidents
which could not be segregated and each insurance carrier was ordered
to contribute one-half and the Travelers thereupon made a settlement
with claimant and The Century Indemnity Company brought proceedings in error.
1. Any party to a judicial proceeding, against whom a several
award or judgment has been entered may accept that award or judgment as final and make a settlement thereon.
2. The commission was acting within its jurisdiction in making
an award on a rehearing where it finds a mistake in a former award
and there is evidence to support the findings that such mistake has
been made'
3.
In this case, the commission did not act in the matter of
changing its award until after it had heard additional evidence and
there being sufficient additional evidence to show a mistake the award
was properly made.
4. The medical testimony is sufficient to sustain the findings of
the commission that the claimant was suffering a ten per cent disability
as a working unit by reason of these two accidents.
5. The liability of each of the two insurance carriers to pay
compensation is a contractual liability and is a several and not a joint
obligation.
6. Each insurance carrier contracted to indemnify the employer
for a portion of a disability caused by two accidents for which-the
employer is unquestionably liable and it was within the province of.the
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affirmed.

to

prorate

the

liabilities

between

them.-Judgment

Mr. Justice Bouck dissents.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-RIGHT OF ACTION OF WIFE WHERE SHERIFF
SHOOTS HUSBAND-People us. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company-No. 13723-Decided July 6, 1936--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Bouck, acting Chief Justice.
Mrs. George Putnum. as relatrix, in the name of the people
brought suit in the court below to recover on the official bond given by
the sheriff of Costilla county.
Besides alleging the execution and
delivery of the bond the complaint alleged that while her husband
was traveling by automobile on the highway of Costilla county that
the sheriff and his deputies in attempting to arrest her husband as a
bandit shot and killed him; that they were without any warrant for
his arrest and that he had not violated any law and that the officers
were entirely without knowledge or information that he was a bandit
and that he was the sole support of the relatrix and of his minor child.
Demurrer to the complaint was sustained in the court below.
1. No right was given at common law to the wife for the killing of her husband.
2. The only right in the wife to pursue a remedy for wrongful
death of her husband is that given by compiled laws of 1921, section
6302.
3.
Under the Colorado statute, no right is given to the wife
to recover for loss of support occasioned by the death of her husband
outside of the remedy provided by the above statute and this case was
not covered by the statute.
4.
No right is given in Colorado to any contracting party to
recover for loss resulting from the incidental interference with his or
her contractual rights by the killing of the person with whom he or
she has entered into contract, whether that person be his or her spouse
or not.
5.
Since the legislature has not seen fit to grant a right of re-

covery in such case there is no power in the court to grant a right of
recovery.--Judgment affirmed.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-BANK EMPLOYEE CARRYING DEPOSITS
FROM ONE TOWN TO ANOTHER-INJURY BY ACCIDENTAL
DISCHARGE OF GUN IN AUTOMOBILE-ACCIDENT ARISING OUT
OF AND IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT-The Security State Bank
at Sterling, et al. vs. Propst, et al.-No. 13829-Decided July 6,
1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
This is a case in which the widow of a deceased employee filed
with the Industrial Commission a claim for compensation.
The claim
was allowed.
Subsequently suit was instituted in the district court
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by the employer and insurer to vacate the award and judgment was
for claimant. Claimant's husband was assistant cashier of the bank at
Sterling, Colorado. He lived at Merino twelve miles distant and frequently brought deposits from the bank's customers at Merino on his
daily trips to Sterling. He was injured by the accidental discharge
of a revolver that he carried in the automobile from the result of which
he died.
1. Where a bank employee, in accordance with a custom approved by hsi superiors, brings deposits of money from a town other
than that in which the bank is located and is injured before arriving at
the bank, his place of work, such injury occurred in performing his
services arising out of and in the course of his employment.
2. If, at the time of the injury, the deceased was doing what he
expressly or impliedly was directed by his superiors to do and the latter
were vested with the authority to give him directions, then he was
acting within the course of his employment.
3. Where an employee is doing something which, though not
strictly in the line of his obligatory duty, is still doing something incidental to his work, and while doing the same is injured, the accident
causing the injury may properly be held to arise out of and in the
course of employment.
4. The fact that he was injured by a gun carried in his car and
when--it further appears that the president of the bank knew of the
gun being carried and made no objection to it and it further appearing
that he had obtained a permit from the sheriff for the carrying of the
gun and it further appearing that the gun was for the protection of
the deposits that the employee had gathered up, the carrying of the
gun in the car was a reasonable precaution for the employee to adopt
in carrying out his duties.-Judgment affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DETERMINING AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION-DEDUCTING TIME SPENT IN COLLEGE-The Lindner

Packing and Provision Company, et al. vs. The Industrial Commission of Colorado, et al.-No. 13970-Decided July 20,
1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
The district court sustained an award of compensation to the
dependents of Joseph M. O'Grady, whose death was proximately caused
by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment,
The only issue involved is the amount to which the dependents are
entitled. For eight months of the year immediately preceding the
accident the deceased was registered as a student and attended Regis
College. During vacation periods he worked for his father. The
commission found his wages earned by such employment to be the
sum of $352.36. The question is whether the time spent in college
which was 32 3/7 'weeks shall be considered as time in which he was
engaged in business for himself.
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1. The workmen's compensation statute provides, among other
things, that in case where the injured employee has been ill and unable to work in consequence of such illness or has been in business for
himself during the twelve months immediately preceding the accident,
his average weekly earnings shall be computed by dividing the total
amount earned during such twelve months by the sum representing the
difference between fifty-two and the number of weeks during which such
employee was so ill or in business for himself.
2. Deceased's services were not on the labor market while he
was in school. Since his services were withdrawn from the labor
market for a part of the year by reason of a definite and regular program
that occupied his time, such as going to college, a program that the
claimant adopted and made it his business to carry out, a program that
under the record excluded the possibility of his services being on the
labor market while it was being carried out, the deceased may reasonably be said to have been in business for himself while he was attending college.-Judgment affirmed.

ESTATES-RIGHT OF ADMINISTRATRIX TO BRING SUIT TO RECOVER
REAL PROPERTY-MOTION TO DISMISS-Weater, as Admin-

istratrix vs. Weaver-No. 13968-Decided July 13,

1936-

Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.

The administratrix brought suit in the district court to recover
certain real estate claimed to have belonged to her intestate for the
purpose of being available for the payment of debts allowed against the
estate. The suit was authorized by the probate court. Subsequent to
lodging the record on error, the defendant in error died and thereafter
counsel representing him at the trial moved that the administrator of
his deceased client's estate be substituted and counsel for plaintiff in
error consented and substitution was ordered. Thereafter, defendant
in error moved to dismiss the writ of error on two grounds. First,.
that the action does not survive as against the administrator of an
estate, and second that the administrator has no cause of action as the
heirs are the only persons who can maintain proceedings to recover real
estate.
1. While the administratrix could maintain the suit in the first
instance, the question of whether she may do so on error, which is a
new suit against the administrator of defendant in error, not decided
at this time, but the question reserved for final determination later.
2. Where it appears that there was not sufficient assets in an
estate to pay claims the administratrix with permission of the county
court may bring suit to recover real estate claimed to have belonged
to her intestate for the purpose of paying the debts of the estate.
3. Motion to dismiss denied.

